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ABSTRACT. – The effect of trade quotas on firms’ incentive to invest in
cost-reducing R&D is studied in a two-stage price-setting duopoly game.
A domestic and a foreign firm first choose R&D levels and then set
the prices of their differentiated products in the domestic market. With
a quota imposed at, or close to, the free-trade level of imports, the
domestic firm faces less competition than under free-trade and invests
less in R&D. Contrarily, the constrained foreign firm invests more in R&D
as the negative strategic effect of a reduction in its cost is now absent.
These results differ partially from the Cournot duopoly case in which R&D
expenditures are lower for both the firms. As the quota becomes more
restrictive, the domestic firm increases and the foreign firm decreases its
expenditures on R&D. Domestic welfare is always higher under free-trade
than under any quota regardless of the degree of product substitutability.
Incitations a` l’innovation afin de re´duire les couˆts
de production sous des restrictions quantitatives a`
l’importation.
R ´ESUM ´E. – Dans cet article, une firme nationale et une firme e´trange`re
choisissent leurs niveaux de R&D dans un premier temps, puis fixent les
prix de leurs produits diffe´rencie´s sur le marche´ national. Si le quota
impose´ est e´gal ou est suffisamment proche du niveau des importations
sous libre e´change, la firme nationale investit moins en R&D. La firme
e´trange`re contrainte investit plus, vu que l’effet strate´gique ne´gatif de
la re´duction des couˆts par la R&D disparaıˆt. On montre aussi que le
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inde´pendamment du degre´ de substituabilite´ des produits.
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1 Introduction
The use of trade policies aimed at protecting domestic industries is
sometimes justified using the “infant industry” argument. Those in favor
of this type of policy argue that trade protection is industry-promoting
in the sense that domestic producers, sheltered from foreign competition,
can choose long-run strategic variables 1, that ensure long-run gains in
profitability 2. Investment in cost-reducing innovation is one of such strategic
variables. Protectionist measures have been shown to affect this variable
choice in the “wrong” direction, as shown by REITZES [1991].
REITZES [1991] looks at the impact of quotas (and tariffs) on strategic
R&D behavior. Using a two-stage Cournot duopoly game, where firms
initially choose R&D levels and subsequently compete in quantities, Reitzes
shows that both the domestic and the foreign firm choose lower levels of
cost-reducing R&D when a quota is set at the free trade level of production
than under free trade. The reason for the decline in R&D is that, in the
presence of a quota, the strategic value of R&D vanishes. With a quota,
the domestic firm becomes a monopolist on the residual demand, and thus
chooses its cost-minimizing level of R&D expenditures. The foreign firm,
constrained by the quantity it may sell, will also have less incentives to
invest in cost reduction. Note that, although domestic productive efficiency
deteriorates as a consequence of the quota, its relative (to the foreign
country) efficiency does not necessarily become worse. With the exception
of REITZES [1991], very little has been written on the effects of this type of
protection on firms’ investment in cost-reducing assets.
In this paper, the objective is to study whether REITZES’ [1991] results
still hold under price competition, since it is known that price competition
produces effects on incentives to innovate which are usually the reverse from
Cournot competition. For instance, with respect to the well known BRANDER
and SPENCER [1985] result where they show that in a Cournot model
the domestic government should subsidize exports EATON and GROSSMAN
[1986] show that changing the assumption to price competition results in
the domestic government taxing exports. Further, BESTER and PETRAKIS
[1993] show that if the domestic and the foreign goods are relatively close
substitutes, Cournot competition provides weaker incentives to invest in
cost-reducing R&D than Bertrand competition, and vice versa for high
substitutability among goods. Note, that in all these papers changing the
choice variable results in a complete reversal of the outcomes.
1. Examples of strategic variables are quality, R&D investment, expenditure on innovation etc.
2. This is the political economy argument towards infant industry protection. The economic
argument for industry protection refers to spillovers. Either of these two arguments may be
behind protectionist practices. In this paper, we are concerned with the former argument. The
case of India, where industrialists wholeheartedly supported the erection of import barriers,
leading to the erection of substantial regulatory barriers, is an example of the desire to ensure
the ’growth’ of domestic industry through protection (KUJAL, 1996).
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We show that in a price setting game, when a quota is set at the free
trade level, the domestic firm lowers and the foreign firm increases its
expenditures on R&D. This result (unlike the complete reversal obtained in
other papers) is a partial reversal from REITZES’ [1991], where both firms
invest less in R&D. Under price competition, foreign investment in R&D has
a negative indirect (strategic) effect on foreign firm’s profits: higher foreign
firm’s investment in R&D makes the domestic firm lower its price, which
in turn results in lower price and profits for the foreign firm. This makes
the foreign firm “underinvest” in R&D. With the introduction of a quota,
the negative effect disappears for the foreign firm and investment in R&D
increases necessarily for the constrained case. Under Cournot competition,
the strategic effect has just the opposite sign, which explains the reversal
of the results for the foreign firm. Contrarily (as in REITZES [1991]), as
the domestic firm faces less competition from the foreign firm after the
imposition of the quota it underinvests in R&D. As a consequence, under
price competition the domestic industry´s absolute and relative productive
efficiency necessarily decreases in the presence of a quota. Then the infant
industry argument cannot be even partially justified as in Reitzes ´ case.
We further show that these qualitative results depend also on how
restrictive the quota is. As the quota becomes more restrictive the domestic
firm increases and the foreign firm decreases its expenditures on R&D. For a
restrictive enough quota, the domestic firm’s level of R&D expenditure may
exceed the free trade level, and the foreign firm’s may decrease relatively
to the free trade case. These results are important since, unlike suggested
by the infant industry protection argument, strategic variable choices may
change in the “wrong” direction: if less R&D takes place domestically while
the foreign firm increases its own effort to reduce costs, the relative domestic
production cost increases. This also renders less likely that protection will
be just temporary, if the domestic firm is to survive future competition.
Domestic R&D efforts may increase, but this can only be achieved if the
quota is restrictive enough.
Finally, we show that domestic welfare is always higher under free trade
independently of the degree of product differentiation. This result constitutes
a strong argument against this type of protectionist policies. However, if
the quota is to be imposed, the right level of quota will depend on the
degree of product differentiation. If the goods are close enough substitutes
the domestic government may want to completely shut the foreign firm out
of the domestic market. If the goods are significantly differentiated, then
the right level of the quota will be at the free-trade level of production.
This may explain why in many developing countries, close substitutes to
domestic production were completely shut out of the market.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented
and equilibrium under free trade determined. In Section 3, equilibrium
after the imposition of an import quota is determined for a sequential move
price setting game. Section 4 presents the welfare analysis and Section 5
concludes.
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2 The Model under Free Trade
There are two firms, one domestic and one foreign. Firms produce goods
which are imperfect substitutes and sell their production in the domestic
market only 3. Firms face the following (symmetric) demand functions 4:
measures the degree of product differentiation. As goes to zero, each
firm becomes a local monopolist. When goes to one, firms’ goods are
almost perfect substitutes. To avoid corner solutions, we shall assume that
. The domestic firm is denoted by , and the foreign
firm by . Both firms have initially the same unit production costs, .
Firms can invest in R&D in order to reduce their unit cost. In particular,
by investing firm will reduce its cost by .
Firms play a two-stage game. In stage one, firms simultaneously decide
on how much to invest in cost-reducing R&D. In stage two, given the
(reduced) unit cost, firms decide simultaneously on which price to set. It
should be noted that R&D has a commitment value in this context. Firms
can use R&D strategically to improve their position in the subsequent market
competition game. The problem is solved recursively for the equilibrium
outcomes, i.e., we restrict our attention to the subgame perfect equilibria.
(i) the market competition stage
Firm chooses to maximize profits:
and are taken as given. This defines each firm’s reaction function:
In figure , firms’ reaction functions under free trade are depicted. The
dashed line represents the price firm will choose to set given firm
’s price .
3. This approach to modelling the effects of trade policies is standard to the literature. Of course,
the issue of retaliation is important in trade policy (we would like to thank one of the referees
for pointing this out). However, conditions under which quantity restrictions are only imposed
by the home country has many parallels in real world situations. For example, VERs by
definition are not retaliatory in nature and have been the accepted mode of quantity controls
both in the U.S. and the E.U in their trade with Japan and South Korea. Given that in the
presence of quantity restrictions trade between countries co-exists provides us with ample
evidence that justifies the use of only one active government.
4. These are the demand functions of a representative consumer with utility i j
i j
2
i
2
j i j with representing money, following DIXIT (1979).
Resulting inverse demand is i i j .
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Then equilibrium prices and profits are:
and
FIGURE 1
(ii) the R&D stage
Firm , given , chooses to maximize its profits (defined in (4). From
the first-order conditions and symmetry we obtain optimal R&D spending,
output and price for each firm:
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Firms’ profits are then given by
where .
Note, that under price competition a firm has less incentives to invest
in cost-reducing R&D than under a pure cost-minimizing strategy. There
is a negative strategic effect when firms compete in prices. As a response
to firm ’s reduction of unit cost, its rival decreases its price (see (3)),
thus shifting-in ’s demand function. Firm has now to reduce its price in
order to sell the same output. By lowering its R&D expenditures beyond
the cost-minimizing level, a firm can commit to softer competition in the
subsequent market game.
3 Equilibrium under Import Quotas
In this section we assume that the domestic government precommits to a
given quota level (or, the foreign government precommits to a level of
VER) before the firms decide how much to invest in R&D. For illustrative
purposes we shall concentrate on the analysis of the case where a quota
is set at the free-trade level of imports. A similar reasoning applies to the
case of more restrictive quotas. Henceforth, firm (the foreign firm) is
assumed to be restricted to sell no more than units, with being set at
the free-trade level of imports as defined by (6).
3.1. The Best Response Functions
As shown by KRISHNA [1989], the imposition of quantity restrictions
alters firms’ best response functions in the market competition stage 5. Let
us define as the foreign firm’s price level that yields a demand for
its good just equal to . Clearly, this is a function of the price selected
by the domestic firm . In figure , is represented by the dashed
line between and . Since the quota is set at the free-trade
equilibrium level of production, this line has to go through the free-trade
equilibrium point (the point where the original reaction functions
intersect). Above , the foreign firm is bound by the restriction while
below it the restriction is not binding. Firm ’s best response is not altered
from the free-trade case if since optimal pricing decisions do not
involve firm ’s production exceeding : the domestic firm’s price is low
5. The derivation of the best response functions that follows draws on KRISHNA (1989).
484 6
enough for firm ’s production to be below its free trade level, now the
quota level. However, if the domestic firm’s price exceeds the free-trade
equilibrium price, i.e., if , then, in the absence of a quota, the foreign
firm would like to produce more than . But, that is no longer possible.
The foreign firm’s best response is then to select a price high enough so that
its demand is just equal to the quota level . In this case, the best response
function coincides with the line. Firm ’s best response function
is depicted in figure , given by the kinked full line and is defined by:
if
if
Using (1) this can be written as:
FIGURE 2
Let us now turn to the determination of the domestic firm’s best response
function. Let us define as the function that determines the domestic
price level which, given , yields a demand level for the foreign product
exactly equal to . Graphically, coincides with , since, by
definition one function is the inverse of the other. When firm is bound by
the quota level, then domestic firm’s demand depends only on its own price:
. Hence, above , the domestic firm’s isoprofit
curves are horizontal and there is a unique price, , which maximizes
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its profits. In this case, some consumers are rationed by the (low-priced)
foreign firm. Assume the following rationing rule: consumers lucky enough
to buy the foreign firm’s good, are able to resell it costlessly in the market.
This situation is equivalent to the foreign firm selecting a best reply to .
This, in turn, guarantees a profit level of to the domestic firm, the same
as the profits that a Stackelberg leader, who makes the quota bind on the
foreign firm, can achieve.
Below , the domestic firm’s isoprofit curves remain the same as
under free-trade. As a result, isoprofit curves are kinked along ,
and moreover they are not convex anymore. If the foreign firm’s price is
higher than , then the domestic firm can reach a profit level higher than V
by choosing not to make the foreign firm bound by the quota. If, however,
the foreign firm’s price is lower than , the domestic firm can always
guarantee profits of by choosing . Firm ’s best response function is
given by the two dark dashed lines in figure and is defined by :
if
if
It should be noted that firm ’s best response function is not continuous
and that it assumes two values when (the same profit level can
be reached charging either or ).
3.2. Equilibrium with Sequential Moves
When firms choose prices simultaneously, there is a unique equilibrium
in mixed strategies in the market competition game where the foreign firm
chooses and the domestic firm randomizes over , (see KRISHNA
[1989]). In this equilibrium the domestic firm always obtains profits of :
the profit level that a domestic firm could attain as a Stackelberg leader
that makes the quota bind on the foreign firm. The domestic firm is, thus,
indifferent between being a price leader or choosing its price simultaneously
with its rival. The foreign firm, playing simultaneously, obtains strictly
lower profits than the Stackelberg follower’s profits 6.
Thus, we can imagine that there exist two stages, 1 and 2, before the
good is sold in the market. Since by acting as a Stackelberg follower in the
price competition game it is guaranteed higher profits the foreign firm will
let the domestic firm set its price before it chooses its own. Our justification
for this sequence of moves is along the lines of the existing literature on
6. This is true since a Stackelberg follower (foreign) firm sets a higher price than in the
simultaneous move game ( 2 02) and, moreover, it always sells at the quota level .
As we saw, under simultaneous choice of prices, the foreign firm sells at the quota level only
when the domestic firm sets its price at 1, while it sells less than when the domestic price
is 1, in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, the foreign firm attains higher profits whenever
it acts as a Stackelberg follower.
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the endogeniety of moves. In fact, FURTH and KOVENOCK [1993] 7 use
similar arguments to ours to show endogeniety of moves in a much more
general setting. They also show that precisely in the structure of the Krishna
paper mentioned above the endogenous outcome of player moves is in-fact
along the lines of our argument. That is, the domestic firm emerges as the
Stackelberg leader and the foreign firm the Stackelberg follower.
The imposition of the quota thus changes the timing of player moves.
We, therefore, assume that the firms choose their prices sequentially with
the domestic firm being the Stackelberg leader and the foreign firm the
Stackelberg follower in the price setting game (as in HARRIS [1985]) 8.
So far we have only treated the case of a quota imposed at the free-trade
level of imports. A similar analysis applies to more restrictive quotas. In
what follows, we take as given that the imposition of any quota alters the
sequence of price choices in the market game.
The game becomes a 3-stage game. In the first stage, both firms select
R&D levels. In the second stage, the domestic firm sets its price, and in
the third stage, the foreign firm selects its price.
(i) stage-3
Given and , the foreign firm sells , and charges the market
clearing price:
(ii) stage-2
The domestic firm is now a constrained monopolist facing a residual
demand . Then its profit maximizing price
and output levels are:
Resulting profits are
It should be noted that the domestic price and profits do not depend on
. Note, also that, when the quota is binding on the foreign firm, R&D
7. Also see CORNEO (1995), DENECKERE and KOVENOCK (1992) and SYROPOULOS (1996).
8. Note, that qualitatively similar results hold even when firms set their prices simultaneously.
For the reasons mentioned above and given that mixed strategies in the simultaneous move
game significantly complicate the analysis, we have opted for exposing the sequential move
game only. The analytical treatment of the Bertrand game is available upon request.
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has no strategic value for the domestic firm. Hence, it will simply choose
the cost-minimizing level of R&D, acting as a constrained monopolist.
Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain the foreign firm’s price and profits:
Note that, whatever the reduction of its unit cost, the foreign firm always
sells at the quota level. As a result, its marginal revenue from a reduction in
its unit cost is simply equal to the quota level itself. Hence, the imposition
of the quota removes the negative strategic effect which was present under
free-trade price-competition.
(iii) stage-1
Maximizing profits as defined by (12) and (14), and solving the first-
order conditions, we get the optimal R&D levels for the domestic and the
foreign firms:
Domestic R&D decreases with the quota level. As the quota becomes
more restrictive on the foreign firm, the domestic firm’s residual demand
increases and thus also the profitability of a reduction in its unit cost.
Contrarily, foreign R&D levels increase with the quota level and in a one-
to-one relation. This is because, as we saw, the foreign firm’s marginal
revenue of a reduction in unit cost is equal to the quota, while the marginal
cost is .
Figure depicts as a function of the level of the quota imposed
on the foreign firm.
FIGURE 3
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Finally, prices, quantities and profits can now be determined:
Domestic profits increase as the quota becomes more restrictive, since
more residual demand allows the domestic firm to attain higher profit levels,
while foreign profits decrease 9.
PROPOSITION 1 : The domestic firm invests less in cost reduction (
) for a quota set at, or close to, the free-trade level ( ) than under
free trade. As the quota ( ) becomes more restrictive, increases.
Proof: With a quota set at the free-trade level, i.e., with , the
resulting investment in cost-reducing tecnology will be below the free
trade value :
is decreasing in since .
PROPOSITION 2 : The foreign firm invests more in cost reduction
than under free-trade when a quota is set at, or close to, the free-
trade level. Investment in R&D decreases with the restrictiveness of the
quota. If the quota is sufficiently restrictive (in particular for ,
the foreign firm invests less than under free trade.
Proof: With a quota set at the free-trade level, i.e., with , the
resulting investment in cost-reducing technology ( ) will be above the
free-trade level ( : (from (6)). Since ,
9. this is easily shown.
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this implies that, for levels of restriction less than free trade level of
innovation , the foreign firm will invest less than it does under
free trade.
When a restraint is set at the free-trade level of imports the foreign firm
chooses to innovate more and the domestic firm less 10. The results under
price competition differ from those obtained under Cournot competition,
where both the domestic and the foreign firm lower their R&D expenditures
after the imposition of the quota (REITZES [1991]). The reason is that,
under Cournot competition, foreign R&D spending has a positive indirect
(strategic) effect on foreign firm’s profits, while under Bertrand competition
this effect is a negative one. Under price competition, a foreign firm’s
increase in R&D spending leads the domestic firm to lower its price, which
in turn results in lower price and profits for the foreign firm. The foreign
firm thus “underinvests” in R&D when there is free trade. Once a quota
is imposed this strategic effect vanishes, since the domestic price no longer
depends on foreign firm’s choice of R&D spending. Consequently, more
investment in cost-reducing R&D takes place in the constrained case than
in the unconstrained case. The effect on the unconstrained domestic firm is
just the opposite. It spends less on R&D after the imposition of the quota
because it faces less competition (since the foreign firm is now constrained).
4 Welfare
In this section we analyze the effect of imposing a quota on domestic
welfare versus free trade. It is shown that total welfare is always the highest
under free trade than under any level of quota for any degree of product
differentiation.
To compute the consumer surplus, recall that preferences are quasi-
linear 11. Hence,
Using (17)-(20) and simplifying, we get:
Total domestic welfare ( ) is defined as the sum of the consumer
surplus and the domestic firm’s profits:
10. It should at this point be stressed that both propositions 1 and 2 also hold under the simultaneous
move game.
11. See footnote 2.
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Then, using (21) we get
It can easily be seen that total domestic welfare under the quota initially
decreases with , it reaches a minimum at and then increases
with . Hence, it reaches its maximum either at or at
depending on the degree of product substitutability.
Figure represents total welfare as a function of the product differentiation
parameter, 12. represents total welfare under free trade.
represents total welfare when the foreign firm is shut out of the market,
which is given by and is independent of the degree of product
differentiation. represents welfare when the quota is set at
the free-trade level of production.
FIGURE 4
Total welfare under free trade is , where (see footnote )
Using (6)-(8) and simplifying, we get:
In figure , total domestic welfare under free trade, is represented
by the upper line. Free trade leads to a higher domestic welfare than the
optimal restriction for any value of the product substitutability parameter.
12. We will restrict our attention to since this condition is necessary to guarantee

i
.
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Welfare is higher under free trade. This result is true for any degree of
product differentiation. The reason is that quotas act as collusion facilitating
practices. As a result, consumers pay much higher prices after the imposition
of the quota, and thus consumer surplus is reduced substantially. The
increase in domestic firm’s profits, on the other hand, is not enough to
compensate for the loss in the consumer surplus. This constitutes a very
strong result against the imposition of quotas. However, if a quota has
to be imposed, then the size of the restriction depends on the degree of
substitutability between the two goods. For sufficiently differentiated goods,
the quota should be set at the free trade level of output of
However, when the goods are close substitutes, it
should be set at . This is along the line of the import substitution
argument: closer substitutes to domestic goods are subject to tighter import
restrictions. Note, the imposition of a quantity restriction (KRISHNA [1989])
facilitates collusion between the foreign and the domestic firm. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that a foreign country has the incentives not to in-fact
retaliate to the quantity restriction as it makes a higher level of profits.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that, under price competition, when a quantity constraint
is imposed at the free trade level of production, or close to it, the foreign
firm increases its expenditures on R&D. The domestic firm, however,
chooses to spend less than in the absence of that quantity restriction.
These results partially differ from the Cournot competition case analyzed by
REITZES [1991] where both the foreign and domestic firm lower their R&D
expenditures. Under price competition, foreign investment in R&D has a
negative strategic effect on foreign firm’s profits: more investment in R&D
by the foreign firm makes the domestic firm lower its own price, which in
turn results in lower price and profit levels for the foreign firm. With the
introduction of a quota this negative effect disappears and foreign firm’s
investment in R&D necessarily increases. Under Cournot competition, the
strategic effect has the opposite sign, which explains this reversal in results
for the foreign firm.
We further show that, as the quota becomes more restrictive, the domestic
firm increases its spending on R&D while the foreign firm decreases it.
In this sense, results in line with the “infant-industry” argument in favor
of protection can be achieved with a quota but only if it is sufficiently
restrictive. As in the “infant industry” argument, industries producing close
substitutes to potential imports desire protection. Finally, it is shown that
domestic welfare is always lower in the presence of a quantity restriction
than under free trade. This result is independent of the degree of product
differentiation and the level of the quantity restriction. This constitutes
a strong argument against the imposition of quantity restrictions, such as
quotas and VERs. The empirical evidence from countries that used this
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type of regulatory policy clearly does not lend support to the infant industry
protection argument either.
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